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Abstract
With the advent of modern communications systems, much attention
has been put on developing methods for securely transferring informa-
tion between constituents of wireless sensor networks. To this effect, we
introduce a mathematical programming formulation for the key man-
agement problem, which broadly serves as a mechanism for encrypting
communications. In particular, an integer programming model of the
q-Composite scheme is proposed and utilized to distribute keys among
nodes of a network whose topology is known. Numerical experiments
demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed model are conducted
using using a well-known optimization solver package. An illustrative
example depicting an optimal encryption for a small-scale network is
also presented.
Keywords: Key management, Wireless sensor networks, q-Composite
method, Integer linear programming, Optimization
1 Introduction
A desirable feature to incorporate in a wireless sensor network (WSN) is the
capability to securely transfer information among its constituents. Achieving
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this requires the advancement of complex encryption strategies that can
guarantee secure communications when one or more network sensors are
compromised (e.g., hacked). Although designing communication schemes
under this scope does not necessarily require that the underlying network
be impervious to any form of attack, it should induce a high tolerance against
the interception of system-wide communications whenever a given number
of sensors are infiltrated.
WSNs are composed of communicating sensors (nodes) embedded in elec-
tronics and software that are capable of collecting, exchanging and/or dis-
seminating information. They have found a wide-range of applications in
many domains and can vastly range in size and connectivity characteristics.
Among others, they have been utilized for monitoring structural “health”
of bridges and other infrastructure, sensing seismic events, traffic control,
diagnosing health of the elderly, pipeline monitoring, agricultural/terrestrial
applications, oceanography, military, and so on (e.g., see [12], [8], [7]). For
instance, [8] considered a sensor network with fifty-nine nodes that was
deployed on the Golden Gate Bridge, with the primary task of collecting
ambient vibrations of the whole structure. In another article, [13] studied
the application of a sixteen-node WSN to monitor volcanic activity, thus
enabling scientific studies that wouldn’t be feasible with conventional in-
strumentation. The sensors nodes that were used had a program memory of
48 KB, 10 KB of static RAM, and 1 MB of external flash memory. Indeed,
[6] states that the memory size for wireless sensor nodes generally range
from 8Kb to 80 Kb of program memory, and 512 bytes to 5.12 KB of data
memory.
Due to the fact that WSNs are often deployed in volatile operational
environments in which nodes may be physically or virtually captured, it is
important to develop communication encryption strategies that are resilient
in such settings. Establishing secure communications typically involves dis-
tributing secret cryptographic keys that are used to encrypt and decrypt
information transfered between network nodes that are within proximity
of one another. Particularly, a given pair of nodes within proximity must
share a certain number of keys in order to directly communicate in a se-
cure manner. Proximities between sensors may, for example, be determined
by various factors like physical distances, geographical obstacles, signal in-
terference, and so on. Then, the problem of distributing keys to sensors,
also known as the key management problem (KMP) in the cyber security
literature, comprises strategies for assigning secret cryptographic keys to
nodes so as to enable all pairs of nodes to directly or indirectly communi-
cate. Additionally, in WSNs the key distribution process is constrained by
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nodes’ capacities and computation power (if any), thereby limiting the num-
ber of keys that they can store and process in a reasonable amount of time,
respectively. Overall, well-constructed key distribution schemes can be ap-
plied to make communications between the sensors secure from interception
and modification.
Many key distribution protocols assume that the topology of the WSN
is not known in advance and apply a key pre-distribution scheme before
the sensors are deployed. One of the most widely utilized pre-distribution
techniques relies on synchronous encryption. Namely, keys are drawn from
a key pool and assigned to the nodes. Any node’s memory capacity, in turn,
limits the number of keys it can store to a small fraction of total keys in
the key pool. Then, in order for a pair of nodes to communicate, they must
share a prescribed number of keys according to a defined scheme. Surveys of
key distribution schemes may be found in [4], [10], and [11]. Several existing
approaches include:
• Single key scheme. Each node is preloaded with the same secret
key and all the sensors use it for encryption of their communication.
Although this scheme is resource efficient in that only one key is stored
in each sensor’s memory, it fails to deliver a resilient security profile
due to the fact that if one node is compromised, then the all network
communications can be intercepted.
• Naive fully pairwise scheme. Each node is preloaded with one
unique key for every other sensor in the WSN, thereby each pair of
nodes can share a unique key. This method offers a high level of
security, as any compromised node only reveals communications with
sensors within its “proximity”. However, it is resource inefficient given
that the memory capacity limits may inhibit sensors from storing a
large number of keys, particularly in cases when the WSNs are large.
• An Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph-based method [6]. Sensors are preloaded
with a key ring comprising of a subset of keys that are randomly
drawn without replacement from a randomly generated key pool. Once
the sensors are randomly deployed (e.g., dropped from an airplane)
and the WSN structure is known, two nodes with shared keys may
establish a link. It was shown that inter-network communications (i.e.,
connectivity) can be guaranteed with a high probability for certain
network configurations and predefined key ring and key pools sizes.
• q-Composite scheme. Similar to the described method [6], yet two
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nodes must share q common keys in order to establish a communication
link.
• Multiple space scheme. Combination of [1] and [6], where ran-
domly scattered nodes establish communication channels if they have
a common key space (see [1]),
• Polynomial pool-based scheme [9]. This approach combines the
techniques in [6] and [2]. Each node is scattered randomly according
to [6]. However, instead of storing crytographic keys, sets of bivariate
symmetric polynomials are stored, which, in turn, are used in a key
exchange scheme defined in [2].
• Combinatorial scheme [3]. A deterministic approach for key distri-
bution based on combinatorial design theory.
In this work, we propose an optimization-based modeling framework
for finding optimal key management policies that produce a desired level
of communication security. The proposed model offers encryption strategies
that provide a user-defined level of security while considering the underlying
WSN’s topology and the limited memory capacities of nodes relative to
the size of the key pool. As a demonstrative example, it employs security
requirements that eliminate the overuse of any particular key by limiting
the number of times it can be assigned among all the sensor nodes, and the
number of times it can be assigned within the neighborhood of any particular
node. This prevents overly repetitive establishment of communications via
the same key, which is a highly desirable security feature.
As an initial application, emphasis is put on the q-composite key pre-
distribution scheme where two nodes within proximity of one another –
defined by an edge connecting them – must share at least q common keys
in order to communicate. We assume that either the topology of the sensor
network is known prior to deployment of the sensors; or that the topology
is known after deployment, in which case, the KMP can be solved to redis-
tribute the keys in the network. Such networks typically form in situations
when the sensors are randomly deployed or scattered, and subsequently need
to establish secure communications among nodes within proximities.
1.1 Our contributions
This study introduces a novel mathematical programming application for
identifying optimal key management strategies in situations when the topol-
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ogy of the underlying WSN is known. Particularly, a quadratically con-
strained integer programming formulation of the q-Composition key distri-
bution scheme is introduced. An equivalent integer linear reformulation is
solved using a well-known off-the-shelf solver. Numerical experiments are
conducted on randomly generated graphs of various configurations. To the
authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to utilize integer programming
techniques to address the key management problem.
1.2 Organization of the paper
The remaining sections are organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
q-Composite key distribution scheme and propose a technique for optimally
assigning keys to the network nodes. The corresponding key management
problem is then formulated as an integer program with quadratic constraints,
and subsequently reformulated as an integer linear program. In Section
3, numerical experiments demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed
approach on networks with various topological configurations for cases when
q = 1 and q = 2 are conducted. Finally, concluding remarks about future
extensions for optimization-based key management problems are given in
Section 4.
2 Problem Formulation
This section describes the q-Composition scheme and proposes a correspond-
ing integer programming formulation that can be solved using standard
optimization software packages. In what follows, it is assumed that they
underlying network is connected and that a given pair of sensor nodes are
connected by an edge if they are within proximity of one another.
2.1 q-Composite key distribution scheme
A special case of the q-Composite key distribution scheme for cases when q =
1 is known as the Eschenauer and Gligor’s method [6], which is summarized
a follows. A key pool comprising a number of keys is randomly generated.
Each key in the key pool is associated with a unique identifier. For each
sensor node i, a subset of keys is selected from the key pool. The chosen
subset is also called the key ring of node i. If two sensor nodes are within
proximity and have at least one common key in their key rings, then they
can communicate securely without relying on any intermediary nodes for
exchanging information. The procedure that utilizes the key identifiers for
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discovering common keys between two nodes is referred to as shared key
discovery [4]. Alternatively, if the key rings of two nodes do not share
any common keys, they can (usually) communicate through a procedure
called key path establishment. In this case, the nodes communicate indirectly
through a sequence of secure links, where the sensors at the two endpoints of
any given link share a common key. Figure 1 illustrates the Eschenauer and
Gligor’s method on a simple network with a predetermined key rings. For
instance, the key ring associated with node A is given by {6, 7, 9}. Observe
that sensor nodes A, B, and C are within proximity of one another, and the
key rings corresponding to any given pair share a common key. Hence, each
of the three sensors can directly communicate with one another. However,
although sensor D is within proximity of sensor B, they cannot communicate
directly due to the fact that their key rings do not contain a common key.
Consequently, sensor D becomes an isolated node of the network.
Figure 1: An illustration of Eschenauer and Gligor’s scheme
As in the Eschenauer and Gligor’s method, the q-Composite scheme uses
the same procedure for distributing keys among the sensor nodes, for shared
key discovery, and for establishing key paths. However, two nodes that are
within proximity must have at least q common keys in their key rings in order
to communicate. In this sense, the q-Composite scheme offers a higher level
of cryptographic security in that multiple keys may be required to establish
inter-sensor communications. Figure 2 illustrates the mechanism of the q-
Composite scheme when q = 2. Notice that sensors A and B only have one
common key (i.e., key 5), thus they are not able to communicate directly
as their respective key rings must share at least 2 common keys. However,
sensors A and B can communicate indirectly “through” sensor C via key
path establishment.
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Figure 2: An illustration of q-Composite scheme with q = 2
2.2 A mathematical programming representation of the q-
Composite key distribution scheme
In this section, we discuss the assumptions and objective of the defined
q-Composite key distribution problem, and introduce a corresponding the
integer programming model. Given a network whose topology is known, as-
sume that each sensor node has a limited storage capacity that restricts the
number of keys it can store. To assign keys in a highly secure manner, they
should be distributed so as to avoid assigning the same q common keys to
more than one node within any given sensor’s proximity. Additionally, the
overuse of any given key is restricted by limiting the number of times it can
be assigned to the nodes. Altogether, the emergent optimization problem
involves maximizing the number of sensors within proximity of one another
that can communicate (i.e., share at least q keys), all while satisfying the
sensors’ memory capacities and the required communication security level.
We next present an integer program with quadratic constraints that can pro-
vide optimal key management policies for the q-Composite key distribution
scheme under the defined setting.
2.2.1 An integer programming formulation
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected, simple, connected graph that represents
the underlying sensor network, where each vertex is a sensor node, and an
edge (i, j) ∈ E indicates that vertices i and j are within proximity of one
another. Let the set N(i) = {j : (i, j) ∈ E,∀j ∈ V } contain the vertices
adjacent to vertex i ∈ V . Denote K as the set of randomly generated keys
that define the key pool, mk as the amount of memory required to store
key k ∈ K, ci as the memory capacity limit of vertex i ∈ V , and tk as the
maximum number of vertices that key k can be assigned to. Finally, we
define a parameter p ∈ [0, 1] to adjust the security “level” by regulating the
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number of times a key can be used for communications by any given vertex.
For a given graph G and a set of keys K, define the following decision
variables:
xik =
{
1, if key k ∈ K is assigned to node i ∈ V
0, otherwise,
zij =
{
1, if edge (i, j) ∈ E have q common keys
0, otherwise.
Then, the described q-Composite KMP can be formulated as follows:
max
x,z
∑
(i,j)∈E
zij (1a)
s. t.
∑
k∈K
mkxik ≤ ci, ∀ i ∈ V (1b)∑
k∈K
xikxjk ≥ qzij , ∀ (i, j) ∈ E (1c)∑
j∈N(i)
xikxjk ≤ p|N(i)|+ α, ∀ i ∈ V,∀k ∈ K (1d)∑
i∈V
xik ≤ tk, ∀ k ∈ K (1e)
xik ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i ∈ V, ∀ k ∈ K (1f)
zij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E, (1g)
where the objective (1a) maximizes the number of vertices that can directly
communicate, thereby maximizing the communication effectiveness of the
network. Constraints (1b) enforce that the key ring of any given vertex
i ∈ V does not exceed its memory capacity limit ci. Constraints (1c) deter-
mine whether a given vertex pair (i, j) that are within proximity share at
least q common keys. For a given vertex i ∈ V and key k ∈ K, constraint
(1d) restricts the number of times that k can be used by i to encrypt commu-
nications with vertices in its neighborhood N(i). The parameter p ∈ [0, 1]
represents a percentage, while α is a positive integer that is adjusted to en-
sure that p|N(i)| + α is greater or equal to 1. Finally, to prevent excessive
use of a given key k ∈ K, constraints (1e) prevents k from being assigned
more than tk times among all the vertices.
The quadratic terms in constraints (1c) and (1d) can be linearized using
standard techniques from binary programming. Consider a quadratic term
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w1w2, where w1, w2 ∈ {0, 1}. Then, w1w2 can be equivalently represented
by introducing a binary variable y12 ∈ {0, 1} and the following auxiliary
inequalities:
y12 ≤ w1, y12 ≤ w2 (2a)
y12 ≥ w1 + w2 − 1. (2b)
Analogously, by replacing each quadratic term xikxjk in Constraints (1c) and
(1d) with a binary variable yk(i,j), and introducing the necessary auxiliary
inequalities, an equivalent integer linear program takes the form
max
x,y,z
∑
(i,j)∈E
zij (3a)
s. t. (1b), (1e)− (1g)∑
k∈K
yk(i,j) ≥ qzij , ∀ (i, j) ∈ E (3b)∑
j∈N(i)
yk(i,j) ≤ p|N(i)|+ α, ∀ i ∈ V,∀k ∈ K (3c)
yk(i,j) ≤ xik, yk(i,j) ≤ xjk, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (3d)
yk(i,j) ≥ xik + xjk − 1, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E,∀k ∈ K (3e)
yk(i,j) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E,∀k ∈ K. (3f)
Although the introduced model assumes particular “security” constraints
and an objective function that govern how the keys are distributed, various
extensions and modifications can easily be introduced. Namely, the inequal-
ities (1d) and (1e) can be modified (or removed) to meet the application at
hand. For instance, rather than preventing a key k ∈ K from being assigned
to vertices within the immediate neighborhood of vertex i ∈ V , inequalities
(1d) can be modified to prevent assignment of k within a specified distance
of i. Furthermore, since the objective function in model (1) increases the
likelihood that a key path can be established between any pair of vertices
by maximizing the number of adjacent vertices that share at least q keys,
additional constraints requiring that all vertices within proximity of each
other must share q or more keys can be included. At the cost of addi-
tional complexity, this enhancement would guarantee the existence of a key
path between any pair of vertices. Alternative variants of model (1) may
involve designing key distribution strategies that maximize the number of
vertices that would need to be compromised so as to obtain all the keys used
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for network-wide communications. Finally, for settings where the network
topology is not known in advance, model (1) can be extended to consider
graphs with randomly changing topologies. Depending on the requirements
for secure key distributions and the availability of historical data, optimiza-
tion techniques including robust optimization, stochastic optimization, and
dynamic optimization can be applied to tackle the underlying stochastic
settings. Such modeling extensions and corresponding solution algorithmic
techniques will be pursued in subsequent studies.
3 Case studies
Numerical experiments analyzing the effectiveness and solution performance
of the proposed model were conducted. Problem (3) was solved for cases
when q = 1, 2 for randomly generated Erdos-Re´nyi graphs of orders |V | =
10, 30, 50, 100 with average densities in the range [0.04, 0.5]. For any graph
configuration of order |V | and density d, one hundred instances were gener-
ated and solved. Depending on the particular graph instance, the memory
capacity limit of vertices was set to ci = 5, 6, 7, 8, and the total number of
times a given key k ∈ K could be assigned was tk = 3, 4, 5. The larger values
of ci and tk were assigned when solving graph configurations of the larger
orders. Throughout the numerical experiments, we let mk = 1, ∀k ∈ K.
Computational time limits were imposed based on the value of parameter q
(shown below).
For each configuration, the average computational times of the instances
that solved within the time limit were reported. Whenever an optimal so-
lution was not obtained for all the instances of a configuration, the average
computational time was reported for the instances that were solved within
the time limit, while the average optimality gap was reported for the re-
maining instances. All computations were conducted on 64 core Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU E7- 8837 @ 2.67GHz CentOS computer with 1TB of RAM
and implemented in Python 2.7 and Gurobi 7.0.1. Each problem instance
was solved using 1 core.
3.1 Numerical experiments and results for the 1-Composite
key distribution scheme
Thirteen graph configurations with various combinations of |V | in the range
[10, 100] and d in the range [0.03, 0.5] were considered for q = 1. For each
configuration, Table 1 lists values for |V |, d and parameters |K|, q, p, ci, tk;
while Table 2 presents the number of instances that solved within the time
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limit, and the average solution times and/or average optimality gaps. The
computational time limit for each instance was set to 7200 seconds. The
symbol “–” was used to report the solution time for configurations where
the computational time limit was exceeded for all one hundred instances.
For a given order |V |, Table 2 demonstrates that the solution time sig-
nificantly increases as the graph density increases. For graph configuration
instances where optimal solutions were found within the time limit, Figure 3
furnishes a box plot depicting statistics of computation times. It clearly
demonstrates that the computation time increases with higher density val-
ues given that all other parameters remaining fixed (see Configurations 1-4
and Configurations 5-7). Furthermore, when the number of vertices in-
creases, the computation time increases significantly. Due to the fact that
Gurobi only solved two instances of Configuration 8 within the time limit,
the corresponding statistics are not reported in Figure 3. Also, note that
the box plot for Configuration 9 is relatively narrow. This resulted from
the application of sparse graph instances, which, in turn, enabled Gurobi to
obtain optimal key distributions very quickly. Clearly, the computational
effort is heavily influenced by the density and the size of the underlying
graph. Statistics for the optimality gaps are illustrated in Figure 4 for the
instances where an optimal solution was not found within the time limit.
With the sole exception of Configuration 8, which comprised instances with
the highest tested density, the results indicate that the optimality gaps were
generally similar over all the configurations. Notably, the optimality gaps
are relatively small for the tested configurations1.
3.2 Numerical experiments and results for the 2-Composite
key distribution scheme
For the case when q = 2, thirteen graph configurations with various com-
binations of |V | in the range [10, 30] and d in the range [0.15, 0.5] where
considered. The computational time limit for each instance was set to 10800
seconds. As previously, the graph configuration details and parameter values
are shown in Table 3; while the number of instances solved, average solu-
tion times, and average optimality gaps are reported in Table 4. Figures 5-6
presents box plots illustrating summary statistics about the average solution
times and average optimality gaps, respectively. Similar to the case of q = 1,
the computation times increase when the number of vertices or/and density
1 Note that Gurobi may produce a nonzero optimality gap even if the incumbent solu-
tion is optimal. In such cases, additional time is required to validate that the incumbent
solution is optimal
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Configuration # |V | d |K| q p ci tk
1 10 0.2 10 1 0.3 5 3
2 10 0.3 10 1 0.3 5 3
3 10 0.4 10 1 0.3 5 3
4 10 0.5 10 1 0.3 5 3
5 30 0.05 20 1 0.3 6 3
6 30 0.08 20 1 0.3 6 3
7 30 0.10 20 1 0.3 6 3
8 30 0.15 20 1 0.3 6 3
9 50 0.04 30 1 0.4 7 4
10 50 0.05 30 1 0.4 7 4
11 50 0.08 30 1 0.4 7 4
12 100 0.03 60 1 0.4 8 5
13 100 0.05 60 1 0.4 8 5
Table 1: Parameter settings for the example of q = 1
Configuration # # instance solved Average time (s) Average gap (%)
1 100 0.02 0%
2 100 0.07 0%
3 100 0.46 0%
4 100 36.24 0%
5 62 377.15 4.43%
6 51 1026.71 4.48%
7 42 1705.12 5.12%
8 2 454.07 21.10%
9 100 0.61 0%
10 100 2.54 0%
11 20 858.33 5.80%
12 100 12.56 0%
13 57 1994.77 4.99%
Table 2: Computation statistics for the example of q = 1
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Figure 3: A boxplot of computation times (in seconds) for instances solved
within the 7200 second time limit when q = 1
increases. However, the case of q = 2 is generally more computationally
intensive. For the computation times, similar trends can be observed as for
q = 1. However, the case of q = 2 is generally more computationally inten-
sive. This can be observed for Configurations 7, 8, and 11, where Gurobi
could not solve any of the associated instances within the time limit.
3.3 An illustrative example of the 2-Composite key distribu-
tion scheme
Model (3) was solved for the graph in displayed Figure 7 consisting of
|V | = 20, |E| = 23. By way of deducing meaningful experimental parameter
values, we evoke the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for constrained
wireless sensor nodes as described in [5], where the authors focused on de-
vices like the Crossbow Mica2 that have 4 KB RAM, and Texas Instruments
MSP430 chips that have up to 10 KB RAM. According to AES, key lengths
can be 128, 192, or 256 bits (16, 24, 32 bytes). Indeed, the implementation
in [5] employed sensors with 260 bytes of RAM and 5160 bytes of ROM,
where a vertex storing six AES keys in its RAM would require consumption
of 192 bytes of memory. To this end, we let the vertex memory capacity
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Configuration # |V | d |K| q p ci tk
1 10 0.2 10 2 0.4 5 4
2 10 0.3 10 2 0.4 5 4
3 10 0.4 10 2 0.4 5 4
4 10 0.5 10 2 0.4 5 4
5 15 0.2 15 2 0.4 6 4
6 15 0.3 15 2 0.4 6 4
7 15 0.4 15 2 0.4 6 4
8 15 0.5 15 2 0.4 6 4
9 25 0.15 25 2 0.5 7 5
10 25 0.2 25 2 0.5 7 5
11 25 0.3 25 2 0.5 7 5
12 30 0.15 30 2 0.5 8 5
13 30 0.2 30 2 0.5 8 5
Table 3: Parameter settings for the example of q = 2
Configuration # # instances solved Average time (seconds) Average gap (%)
1 100 0.51 0%
2 100 52.82 0%
3 99 108.29 5.56%
4 99 737.41 12.00%
5 85 260.91 6.02%
6 27 995.58 9.70%
7 0 − 18.60%
8 0 − 29.74%
9 100 1.53 0%
10 94 116.19 4.40%
11 0 − 21.89%
12 95 56.8 4.54%
13 20 773.88 10.51%
Table 4: Computation statistics for the example of q = 2
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Figure 4: The boxplot for the optimality gap of the instances terminated
because of reaching time limit for the example of q = 1
limits were ci = 6, ∀i ∈ V . The key pool was fixed at |K| = 20 and tk = 4,
∀k ∈ K.
Benefits of the developed mathematical programming-based protocol can
be demonstrated by comparison against the naive fully pairwise distribution
scheme, which would require two shared keys between each communicating
vertex pair such that no key is used more than once. Observe that the solu-
tion produced by model (3) enables direct or indirect (via key paths) com-
munications between all vertex pairs. However, assuming that the memory
capacity limit of any given vertex does not exceed mk, when implement-
ing a naive pairwise distribution scheme, a minimum spanning tree (not
shown) of the graph in Figure 7 would reveal that the key pool size would
require eighteen additional keys in order to establish communications via
the corresponding nineteen edges.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose an integer programming approach for the key
management problem in wireless sensor networks with emphasis on the q-
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Figure 5: A boxplot of computation times (in seconds) for instances solved
within the 10800 second time limit when q = 2
Composite key distribution scheme for assigning secret keys to sensor nodes.
Numerical experiments demonstrating the effectiveness and computational
efforts required to solve the proposed model are conducted. Experimental
results indicate that the developed method works effectively for small sized
networks.
To enable the identification of optimal key management policies in larger
networks, subsequent studies will focus on developing effective solution meth-
ods for the presented model. Additionally, the authors’ will consider other
variants of key distribution protocols under the scope of mathematical pro-
gramming, as well as stochastic extensions that address setting when the
topology of the underlying wireless sensor network is not known in advance.
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Figure 6: The boxplot for the optimality gap of the instances terminated
because of reaching time limit for the example of q = 2
Figure 7: An optimal key distribution example obtained by solving model
(3) for the case of q = 2 for a graph with |V | = 20, |E| = 23, and |K| = 20
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